## 2AC

### 2AC – Yancy

#### Link to this arg was taken out in cross-ex and on case – we aren’t silent on our own social location in the context of the drug war – we are all foot soldiers

#### Perm do both – collectivity is best

Jones and Campbell, 12 (Richard D. Jones, Department of Communication Studies, Eastern Illinois University, AND Bernadette Marie Campbell, Department of Communication Studies, University of Denver; “Contesting Neoliberalism Through Critical Pedagogy, Intersectional Reflexivity, and Personal Narrative: Queer Tales of Academia” Journal of Homosexuality, 59)

Extending Alcoff’s (1991–1992) reminder to critically question political accountability and positionality, Carrillo Rowe (2005) calls for a shift from “I,” which “announces ‘I am . . . ’ to a sense of ‘self’ that is radically inclined toward others, toward the communities to which we belong, with whom we long to be, and to whom we feel accountable” (p. 18). This means critically minded people, scholars and citizens, must move beyond an individualized location, expanding their accountability from self, to others and self. Through our narratives, we have traced how the development of queer consciousness moved us toward alliance, which critiques the individualism that so heavily inﬂuences and colonizes the imaginary within neoliberalism. Our narratives also recount the pain and isolation that also comes with the daunting task of bridging difference. We ﬁnd hope in Freire’s commitment to establishing critical networks of educators to remake culture and “[confront] the devastating impact of neoliberal economic and social policies” (Darder, 2003, p. 505). Jones (2010) likened such critical networks to a “rhizomatic underground railroad” through which we may transport our radical ideas as critical educators (p. 125). We also ﬁnd inspiration in hooks’ (1994) reminder that our collective commitment to cultural diversity must not be squelched and take pause in her attention to the reality that “we must accept the protracted nature of our struggle and be willing to remain both patient and vigilant” (p. 33). Our alliances may not always be perfect, but as critical scholars we must ﬁnd comfort in the messiness to be able to live with ourselves. Rather than measuring our success on the perfection of our performance as a critical scholar, “our solidarity must be afﬁrmed by shared belief in a spirit of intellectual openness that celebrates diversity, welcomes dissent, and rejoices in collective dedication to truth” (p. 33).

Exclusive focus on blackness fails

**Perea 97** (Juan F. Perea – Professor of Law at Loyola University Chicago, 10/31/97, “The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The Normal Science of American Racial Thought”, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1605&context=californialawreview) //MD

One might object that I am distorting history by suggesting that slavery and the experience of Black Americans has not been of central importance in the formation of American society. I believe **this objection misunderstands my argument.** There can be no question, I think, that slavery and the mistreatment of Blacks in the United States were crucial building blocks of American society. 24 The fact that the text of the Constitution protects slavery in so many places demonstrates the importance of slavery in the foundation of the country.2 5 The constitutional, statutory and judicial attempts to create more equality for Blacks, imperfect as these all have been, correspond to the history of mistreatment of Blacks. My argument is not that this history should not be an important focus of racial studies. Rather, my argument is that the exclusive focus on the development of equality doctrines based solely on the experience of Blacks, and the exclusive focus of most scholarship on the Black-White relationship, constitutes a paradigm which obscures and prevents the understanding of other forms of inequality, those experienced by non-White, non-Black Americans. The Black/White binary paradigm, by defining only Blacks and Whites as relevant participants in civil rights discourse and struggle, tends to produce and promote the exclusion of other racialized peoples, including Latinos/as, Asian Americans and Native Americans, from this crucial discourse which affects us all. This exclusion is both the power and the stricture of the Black/White binary paradigm. Its power derives from the fact that a limited subject of inquiry makes possible the study of the Black-White relationship in extraordinary detail and with great insight. Its stricture, however, is that it has limited severely our understanding of how White racism operates with particularity against other racialized peoples. Furthermore, the binary paradigm renders the particular histories of other racialized peoples irrelevant to an understanding of the only racism-White racism against Blacks-that the paradigm defines to be important. This perceived irrelevance is why the history of Latinos/as, Asian Americans, and Native Americans is so frequently missing from the texts that structure our thinking about race.

#### **Anti-blackness cannot explain orientalist violence against Islam which preceded the Enlightenment**

Charoenying (citing Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Prof of Ethnic Studies, UC Berkeley) 8

(Timothy, Islamophobia & Anti-Blackness: A Genealogical Approach, http://crg.berkeley.edu/content/islamophobia-anti-blackness-genealogical-approach)

The year 1492 marked a major  turning point in the trajectory of Western Civilization. Elementary age children are taught this as the year Columbus famously crossed the Atlantic. An equally significant event that year, was the Spanish conquest of al-Andalus–a Moorish province on the southern Iberian peninsula established eight centuries earlier–and more importantly, the last major Muslim stronghold on the European continent. Critical race scholars have argued that these two events would not only shift the geopolitical balance of power from the Orient to the Occident, but fundamentally alter conceptions about religious and racial identity. According to Nelson Maldonado-Torres, of the University of California, Berkeley, **the expulsion of the Moors from continental Europe marked a transition from an age of imperial relations between Christian and Muslim empires, to an age of European colonial expansion throughout the known world.** The “discovery” of “godless” natives in the Americas would also inspire the great debates between Las Casas and Sepúlveda in 1550 on the nature of the human soul. Such a geopolitical and philosophical shift, Maldonado-Torres argues, would lead to a Eurocentric, re-categorization of humanity based upon religous—and ultimately racial—differences. Maldonado-Torres has proposed that anti-black racism is not simply an extension of some historical bias against blacks, but rather, is an amalgam of old-world Islamophobia linked to the history of the Iberian Peninsula, and to the notion of soulless beings embodied in popular conceptions about the indigenous natives of the Americas. These beliefs would contribute to an ideological basis for, and justification of, colonial conquests in the name of cultural and religious conversion, as well as pave the way for the enslavement and human trafficking of sub-Saharan Africans.

#### **Orientalist Otherization creates a dyad between faiths, making genocidal violence inevitable**

Batur, 2k7 (Pinar Batur, Professor of Sociology and Director of Environmental Studies at Vassar College; “Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide,” 2007, “Handbook of the Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations,” “Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide”)

Albert Memmi argued that “We have no idea what the colonized would have been without colonization, but we certainly see what happened as a result of it”(Memmi, 1965: 114). Events surrounding Iraq and Katrina provide three critical points regarding global racism. The first one is that segregation, exclusion, and genocide are closely related and facilitated by institutions employing the white racial frame to legitimize their ideologies and actions. The second one is the continuation of violence, either sporadically or systematically, with single- minded determination from segregation, to exclusion, to genocide. The third point is that legitimization and justification of violence is embedded in the resignation that global racism will not alter its course, and there is no way to challenge global racism. Together these three points facilitate the base for war and genocide In 1993, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Samuel P. Huntington racialized the future of global conflict by declaring that “the clash of civilizations will dominate global politics” (Huntington 1993: 22). He declared that the fault line will be drawn by crisis and bloodshed. Huntington’s end of ideology meant the West is now expected to confront the Confucian-Islamic “other.” Huntington intoned “Islam has bloody borders,” and he expected the West to develop cooperation among Christian brethren, while limiting the military strength of the “Confucian-Islamic” civilizations, by exploiting the conflicts within them. When the walls of communism fell, a new enemy was found in Islam, and loathing and fear of Islam exploded with September 11. The new color line means “we hate them not because of what they do, but because of who they are and what they believe in.”

Orientalist academia is incredibly dangerous—debate will continue to produce war-inspired knowledge that makes violence and war inevitable

Chow 06 (Rey Chow – Andrew W. Mellon professor of the humanities at Brown, 2006, “The Age of the World Target”, pg. 38-41)

In the decades since 1945, whether in dealing with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, North Korea, Vietnam, and countries in Central America, or during the Gulf Wars, the United States has been conducting war on the basis of a certain kind of knowledge production, and producing knowledge on the basis of war. War and knowledge enable and foster each other primarily through the collective fantasizing of some foreign or alien body that poses danger to the "self" and the "eye" that is the nation. Once the monstrosity of this foreign body is firmly established in the national consciousness, the decision makers of the U.S. government often talk and behave as though they had no choice but war.38 War, then, is acted out as a moral obligation to expel an imagined dangerous alienness from the United States' self-concept as the global custodian of freedom and democracy. Put in a different way, the "moral element," insofar as it produces knowledge about the "self" and "other"—and hence the "eye" and its "target"—as such, justifies war by its very dichotomizing logic. Conversely, the violence of war, once begun, fixes the other in its attributed monstrosity and affirms the idealized image of the self. In this regard, the pernicious stereotyping of the Japanese during the Second World War—not only by U.S. military personnel but also by social and behavioral scientists—was simply a flagrant example of an ongoing ideological mechanism that had accompanied Western treatments of non-Western "others" for centuries. In the hands of academics such as Geoffrey Gorer, writes Dower, the notion that was collectively and "objectively" formed about the Japanese was that they were "a clinically compulsive and probably collectively neurotic people, whose lives were governed by ritual and 'situational ethics,' wracked with insecurity, and swollen with deep, dark currents of repressed resentment and aggression."39 As Dower points out, such stereotyping was by no means accidental or unprecedented: The Japanese, so "unique" in the rhetoric of World War Two, were actually saddled with racial stereotypes that Europeans and Americans had applied to nonwhites for centuries: during the conquest of the New World, the slave trade, the Indian wars in the United States, the agitation against Chinese immigrants in America, the colonization of Asia and Africa, the U.S. conquest of the Philippines at the turn of the century. These were stereotypes, moreover, which had been strongly reinforced by nineteenth-century Western science. In the final analysis, in fact, these favored idioms denoting superiority and inferiority transcended race and represented formulaic expressions of Self and Other in general."' The moralistic divide between "self" and "other" constitutes the production of knowledge during the U.S. Occupation of Japan after the Second World War as well. As Monica Braw writes, in the years immediately after 1945, the risk that the United States would be regarded as barbaric and inhumane was carefully monitored, in the main by cutting off Japan from the rest of the world through the ban on travel, control of private mail, and censorship of research, mass media information, and other kinds of communication. The entire Occupation policy was permeated by the view that "the United States was not to be accused; guilt was only for Japan":41 As the Occupation of Japan started, the atmosphere was military. Japan was a defeated enemy that must be subdued. The Japanese should be taught their place in the world: as a defeated nation, Japan had no status and was entitled to no respect. People should be made to realize that any catastrophe that had befallen them was of their own making. Until they had repented, they were suspect. If they wanted to release information about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it could only be for the wrong rea-sons, such as accusing the United States of inhumanity. Thus this informa-tion was suppressed.42 As in the scenario of aerial bombing, the elitist and aggressive panoramic "vision" in which the other is beheld means that the sufferings of the other matter much less than the transcendent aspirations of the self. And, despite being the products of a particular culture's technological fanaticism, such transcendent aspirations are typically expressed in the form of selfless uni-versalisms. As Sherry puts it, "The reality of Hiroshima and Nagasaki seemed less important than the bomb's effect on 'mankind's destiny,' on 'humanity's choice,' on 'what is happening to men's minds,' and on hopes (now often extravagantly revived) to achieve world government."'" On Ja-pan's side, as Yoneyama writes, such a "global narrative of the universal history of humanity" has helped sustain "a national victimology and phantasm of innocence throughout most of the postwar years." Going one step further, she remarks: "The idea that Hiroshima's disaster ought to be remembered from the transcendent and anonymous position of humanity .. . .might best be described as 'nuclear universalism.' "44 Once the relations among war, racism, and knowledge production are underlined in these terms, it is no longer possible to assume, as some still do, that the recognizable features of modern war—its impersonality, coerciveness, and deliberate cruelty—are "divergences" from the "antipathy" to violence and to conflict that characterize the modern world.45 Instead, it would be incumbent on us to realize that the pursuit of war— with its use of violence—and the pursuit of peace—with its cultivation of knowledge—are the obverse and reverse of the same coin, the coin that I have been calling "the age of the world target." Rather than being irreconcilable opposites, war and peace are coexisting, collaborative functions in the continuum of a virtualized world. More crucially still, only the privileged nations of the world can afford to wage war and preach peace at one and the same time. As Sherry writes, "The United States had different resources with which to be fanatical: resources allowing it to take the lives of others more than its own, ones whose accompanying rhetoric of technique disguised the will to destroy."45 From this it follows that, if indeed political and military acts of cruelty are not unique to the United States—a point which is easy enough to substantiate—what is nonetheless remarkable is the manner in which such acts are, in the United States, usually cloaked in the form of enlightenment and altruism, in the form of an aspiration simultaneously toward technological perfection and the pursuit of peace. In a country in which political leaders are held accountable for their decisions by an electorate, violence simply cannot—as it can in totalitarian countries—exist in the raw. Even the most violent acts must be adorned with a benign, rational story. It is in the light of such interlocking relations among war, racism, and knowledge production that I would make the following comments about area studies, the academic establishment that crystallizes the connection between the epistemic targeting of the world and the "humane" practices of peacetime learning. From Atomic Bombs to Area Studies As its name suggests, area studies as a mode of knowledge production is, strictly speaking, military in its origins. Even though the study of the history, languages, and literatures of, for instance, "Far Eastern" cultures existed well before the Second World War (in what Edward W. Said would term the old Orientalist tradition predicated on philology), the systematization of such study under the rubric of special geopolitical areas was largely a postwar and U.S. phenomenon. In H. D. Harootunian's words, "The systematic formation of area studies, principally in major universities, was .. . a massive attempt to relocate the enemy in the new configuration of the Cold War."47 As Bruce Cumings puts it: "It is now fair to say, based on the declassified evidence, that the American state and especially the intelligence elements in it shaped the entire field of postwar area studies, with the clearest and most direct impact on those regions of the world where communism was strongest: Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, and East Asia."48 In the decades after 1945, when the United States competed with the Soviet Union for the power to rule and/or destroy the world, these regions were the ones that required continued, specialized super-vision; to this list we may also add Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. As areas to be studied, these regions took on the significance of target fields—fields of information retrieval and dissemination that were necessary for the perpetuation of the United States' political and ideological hegemony. In the final part of his classic Orientalism, Said describes area studies as a continuation of the old European Orientalism with a different pedagogical emphasis: No longer does an Orientalist try first to master the esoteric languages of the Orient; he begins instead as a trained social scientist and "applies" his science to the Orient, or anywhere else. This is the specifically American contribution to the history of Orientalism, and it can be dated roughly from the period immediately following World War II, when the United States found itself in the position recently vacated by Britain and France." Whereas Said draws his examples mainly from Islamic and Middle Eastern area studies, Cumings provides this portrait of the Fast Asian target field: The Association for Asian Studies (AAS) was the first "area" organization in the U.S., founded in 1943 as the Far Eastern Association and reorganized as the AAS in 1956. Before 1945 there had been little attention to and not much funding for such things; but now the idea was to bring contemporary social science theory to bear on the non-Western world, rather than continue to pursue the classic themes of Oriental studies, often examined through philology. . In return for their sufferance, the Orientalists would get vastly enhanced academic resources (positions, libraries, language studies)—and soon, a certain degree of separation which came from the social scientists inhabiting institutes of East Asian studies, whereas the Orientalists occupied departments of East Asian languages and cultures. This implicit Faustian bargain sealed the postwar academic deal.50 A largely administrative enterprise, closely tied to policy, the new American Orientalism took over from the old Orientalism attitudes of cultural hostility, among which is, as Said writes, the dogma that "the Orient is at bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible)."" Often under the modest and apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the "scientific" and "objective" production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special "areas" became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic con-ception of the world as target.52 In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disci-plining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war—if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes"—is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to "know" the other cultures? Can 'knowledge" that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare's accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign "self" / "eye"

—the "I"— that is the United States, the other will have no choice but remain just that—a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as at the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber—such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter—will never receive the attention that is due to them. "Knowledge," however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences.54 This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has been, since its inception, haunted by "the absence of a definable object" —and by "the problem of the vanishing object."55

#### Perm do both – collectivity is best

Jones and Campbell, 12 (Richard D. Jones, Department of Communication Studies, Eastern Illinois University, AND Bernadette Marie Campbell, Department of Communication Studies, University of Denver; “Contesting Neoliberalism Through Critical Pedagogy, Intersectional Reflexivity, and Personal Narrative: Queer Tales of Academia” Journal of Homosexuality, 59)

Extending Alcoff’s (1991–1992) reminder to critically question political accountability and positionality, Carrillo Rowe (2005) calls for a shift from “I,” which “announces ‘I am . . . ’ to a sense of ‘self’ that is radically inclined toward others, toward the communities to which we belong, with whom we long to be, and to whom we feel accountable” (p. 18). This means critically minded people, scholars and citizens, must move beyond an individualized location, expanding their accountability from self, to others and self. Through our narratives, we have traced how the development of queer consciousness moved us toward alliance, which critiques the individualism that so heavily inﬂuences and colonizes the imaginary within neoliberalism. Our narratives also recount the pain and isolation that also comes with the daunting task of bridging difference. We ﬁnd hope in Freire’s commitment to establishing critical networks of educators to remake culture and “[confront] the devastating impact of neoliberal economic and social policies” (Darder, 2003, p. 505). Jones (2010) likened such critical networks to a “rhizomatic underground railroad” through which we may transport our radical ideas as critical educators (p. 125). We also ﬁnd inspiration in hooks’ (1994) reminder that our collective commitment to cultural diversity must not be squelched and take pause in her attention to the reality that “we must accept the protracted nature of our struggle and be willing to remain both patient and vigilant” (p. 33). Our alliances may not always be perfect, but as critical scholars we must ﬁnd comfort in the messiness to be able to live with ourselves. Rather than measuring our success on the perfection of our performance as a critical scholar, “our solidarity must be afﬁrmed by shared belief in a spirit of intellectual openness that celebrates diversity, welcomes dissent, and rejoices in collective dedication to truth” (p. 33).

**Positioning personal experience as a justification for action creates an insulation from reevaluation--“You can’t criticize how I felt!” This process prevents criticism of the status quo, which can be rendered as purely subjective—“That’s only your experience, it can’t be applied to larger structural problems of social organization.” Vote affirmative to affirm criticism of ANY identity categories.**

Scott 97. Joan Scott, Professor of History at Princeton, 1997, Feminists Theorize the Political, “Experience”

When the evidence offered is the evidence of “experience,” the claim for referentiality is further buttressed – what could be truer, after all, than a subject's own account of what he or she has lived through? It is precisely this kind of appeal to experience as uncontestable evidence and as an originary point of explanation – as foundation upon which analysis is based – that weakens the critical thrust of histories of difference. By remaining within the epistemological frame of orthodox history, these studies lose the possibility of examining those assumptions and practices that excluded considerations of difference in the first place. They take as self-evidence the identities of those whose experience is being documented and thus naturalize their difference**.** They locate resistance outside its discursive construction and reify agency as an inherent attribute of individuals, thus decontextualizing it. When experience is taken as the origin or knowledge, the vision of the individual subject (the person who had the experience of the historian who recounts it) becomes the bedrock of evidence upon which explanation is built. Questions about the constructed nature of experience, about how sunjects are constituted as different in the first place, about how one's vision s structured – about language (or discursive) and history – are left aside. The evidence of experience then becomes evidence for the fact of difference rather than a way of exploring how difference is established, how it operates, how and in what ways it constitutes subjects who see and act in the world. To put it another way, the evidence of experience, whether conceived through a metaphor of visibility or in any other way that takes meaning as transparent, reproduces rather than contests given ideological system- those that assume that the facts of history speak for themselves and, in the case of histories of gender, those that rest on notions of a natural or established opposition between sexual practices and social conventions, and between homosexuality and heterosexuality. Histories that document the hidden world of homosexuality, for example, show the impact of silence and repression on the lives of those affected by it and bring to light the history of their suppression and exploitation. But the project of making experience visible precludes critical examination of the workings of the ideological system itself, it's categories of representation (homosexual/heterosexual, man/woman, black/white as fixed immutable identities), its premises about what these categories mean and how they operate, its notions of subjects, origin, and cause. The project of making experience visible precludes analysis of the workings of this system and of its historicity; instead it reproduces its terms. We come to appreciate the consequences of the closeting of homosexuals and we understand repression as an interested act of power or domination; alternative behaviors and institutions also become available to us. What we don't have is a way of placing those alternatives within the framework of (historically contingent) dominant patterns of sexuality and the ideology that supports them. We know they exists, but not the extent of the critique. Making visible the experience of a different group exposes the existence of repressive mechanisms, but not their inner workings or logics; we know that difference exists, but we don't understand it as constituted relationally. For that we need to attend to the historical processes that, through discourse, position subjects and produce their experiences. It is not individuals who have experience, but subjects who are constituted through experience. Experience in this definition then becomes not the origin of our explanation, not the authoritative (because seen or felt) evidence that grounds what is know, but rather what we seek to explain, that about which knowledge is produced. To think about experience in this way is to historicize it as well as to historicize the identities it produces. This kind of historicizing represents a reply to the many contemporary historians who have argued that an unproblematized “experience” is the foundation of their practice; it is a historicizing that implies critical scrutiny of all explanatory categories usually taken for granted, including the category of “experience.”

Their arguments about personal agency are ultimately conservative and de-politicizing – arguments for localizing activism within the purview of social location are the equivalent of privatizing social change, creating us as dependent on the necessity of their advocacy. The more successful their strategy is the more damage it does by making institutions necessary to our understanding of social change

Hershock '99**,** East-West Center, 1999.  [“Changing the way society changes”, *Journal of Buddhist Ethics*, 6, 154; <http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/6/hershock991.html>]

The trouble is that, like other technologies biased toward control, the more successful legislation becomes, the more it renders itself necessary. Because it aims at rigorous definition -- at establishing hard boundaries or limits -- crossing the threshold of legislative utility means creating conditions under which the definition of freedom becomes so complex as to be self-defeating. Taken to its logical end, legally-biased social activism is thus liable to effect an infinite density of protocols for maintaining autonomy, generating a matrix of limits on discrimination that would finally be conducive to what might be called "axiological entropy" -- a state in which movement in any direction is equally unobstructed *and* empty of dramatic potential. Contrary to expectations, complete "freedom of choice" would not mean the elimination of all impediments to meaningful improvisation, but rather an erasure of the latter's conditions of possibility. The effectiveness and efficiency of "hard," control-biased technologies depend on our using natural laws -- horizons of possibility -- as fulcrums for leveraging or dictating changes in the structure of our circumstances. Unlike improvised contributions to changes taking place in our situation, dictating the terms of change effectively silences our situational partners. Technological authority thus renders our circumstances mute and justifies ignoring the contributions that might be made by the seasons or the spiritual force of the mountains to the meaning -- the direction of movement -- of our ongoing patterns of interdependence. With the "perfection" of technically-mediated control, our wills would know no limit. We would be as gods, existing with no imperatives, no external compulsions, and no priorities. We would have no reason to do one thing first or hold one thing, and not another, as most sacred or dear. Such "perfection" is, perhaps, as fabulous and unattainable as it is finally depressing. Yet the vast energies of global capital are committed to moving in its direction, for the most part quite uncritically. The consequences -- as revealed in the desecration and impoverishing of both 'external' and 'internal' wilderness (for instance, the rainforests and our imaginations) -- are every day more evident. The critical question we must answer is whether the "soft" technologies of legally-biased and controlled social change commit us to an equivalent impoverishment and desecration. The analogy between the dependence of technological progress on natural laws and that of social activism on societal laws is by no means perfect. Except among a scattering of philosophers and historians of science, for example, the laws of nature are not viewed as changeable artifacts of human culture. But for present purposes, the analogy need only focus our attention on the way legal institutions -- like natural laws -- do not prescriptively determine the shape of all things to come, but rather establish generic limits for what relationships or states of affairs are factually admissible. Laws that guarantee certain "freedoms" necessarily also prohibit others. Without the fulcrums of *unallowable* acts, the work of changing a society would remain as purely idealistic as using wishful thinking to move mountains. Changing legal institutions at once forces and enforces societal reform. By affirming and safeguarding those freedoms or modes of autonomy that have come to be seen as generically essential to 'being human', a legally-biased social activism cannot avoid selectively limiting the ways we engage with one another. The absence of coercion may be a basic aim of social activism, but if our autonomy is to be guaranteed both fair and just, its basic strategy must be one of establishing non-negotiable constraints on how we co-exist. Social activism is thus in the business of striking structural compromises between its ends and its means -- between particular freedoms and general equality, and between practical autonomy and legal anonymity. By shifting the locus of freedoms from unique persons to generic citizens -- and in substantial sympathy with both the Platonic renunciation of particularity and the scientific discounting of the exceptional and extraordinary -- social activist methodology promotes dramatic anonymity in order to universally realize the operation of 'blind justice'. Much as hard technologies of control silence the contributions of wilderness and turn us away from the rewards of a truly joint improvisation of order, the process of social activism reduces the relevance of the always unique and unprecedented terrain of our interdependence. This is no small loss. The institutions that guarantee our generic independence effectively pave over those vernacular relationships through which our own contributory virtuosity might be developed and shared -- relationships out of which the exceptional meaning of our immediate situation might be continuously realized. In contrast with Buddhist emptiness -- a practice that entails attending to the mutual relevance of all things -- both the aims and strategies of social activism are conducive to an evacuation of the conditions of dramatic virtuosity, a societal depletion of our resources for meaningfully improvised and liberating intimacy with all things.

### 2AC – Rodriguez

#### Theoretical thinking concerning security problematizes militarized practices like the “war on drugs” – it constitutes reality

**Bilgin, 5** – Professor of IR, Bikent University, *Regional Security In The Middle East A Critical Perspective*, Page 7

From a critical perspective, thinking differently about security involves: first, challenging the ways in which security has traditionally been conceptualised by broadening and deepening the concept and by rejecting the primacy given to the sovereign state as the primary referent for, and agent of, security. Critical approaches also problematise the **militarised** and zero-sum practices informed by prevailing discourses and call for reconceptualising practice. Second, thinking differently entails rejecting the conception of theory as a neutral tool, which merely explains social phenomena, and emphasises the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice. That is, the way we (the community of students of security) think and write about security informs practice; it privileges certain practices whilst marginalising others, thereby helping **constitute** what human beings choose to call **'reality'**. Theory is itself a form of practice; theorising is recognised as a political activity. Finally, adopting a critical approach to security implies adopting an explicitly normative (for some, emancipation-oriented) approach to security in theory and practice.

#### Poetic discursive methods like the narcocorrido transforms our understanding of global politics by disrupting static, entrenched values and creating spaces for thought to rupture sovereign power

Bleiker, 2000(Roland, coordinator of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program @ U of Queensland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency, & Global Politics)

Poetry does, in a sense, what critical international theory seeks to do: instead of accepting prevailing structures of the world as given, it questions them in an effort to create space for alternative and perhaps more inclusive ways of organising global life.46 Poetry reveals how important political transformations may occur through practices of dissent that deliberately and self-consciously stretch, even violate existing linguistic rules. ‘Inventions from the unknown’, Arthur Rimbaud says, ‘demand new forms’.47 The present, relatively limited analysis of the Prenzlauer Berg poetry scene should thus be seen as a case study that illustrates how, in a much larger context, discursive forms of dissent have the potential to transgress boundaries and engender human agency, not by directly causing particular events, but by creating a language that provides us with different eyes, with the opportunity to reassess anew the spatial and political dimensions of global life. Discursive and transversal forms of dissent unleash their power only through a long process that entails digging, slowly, underneath the foundations of authority. They work through a gradual and largely inaudible transformation of values. A poetic search for thinking space, for instance, acknowledges that there are no quick and miraculous forms of dissent to discursive domination. Poetry resists the temptation to provide ‘concrete’ answers to ‘concrete’ questions. It does not bring certainty. In fact, poetry generates more questions, creates ambivalence and doubt. And in doing so it comes to terms with the death of God, makes room for a more tolerant politics, recognises that a society is oppressive and closed if all major questions either have an answer or are considered irrational, absurd, taboo.48

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Personal experience precludes objection

Subotnik 1998 – professor of law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center (7 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 681)

Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, the central CRT message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly, or even that individuals out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - but that **the minority scholar** himself or herself hurts and hurts badly.¶ An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. What can an academic trained to [\*694] question and to doubt n72 possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"? n73 "No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"? "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our lives is... ultimately obliterating." n74¶ "Precarious." "Obliterating." These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by **effectively precluding objection**, disconcert and disunite others. "I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects. First, it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly n75 - destructive and, above all, self-destructive arti [\*695] cles. n76 Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves from their pain in order to gain perspective on their condition. n77¶ [\*696] Last, as we have seen, it precludes the possibility of **open and structured conversation** with others. n78¶ [\*697] It is because of this conversation-stopping effect of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" that Farber and Sherry deplore their use. "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny.¶ If through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race, n80 I suggest, has generated a kind of cynicism in white audiences which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. It drives the American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected.¶ In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, the kinds of issues raised by Williams are too important in their implications [\*698] for American life to be confined to communities of color. If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.

Coalitions are key

Halberstam 13 (Jack Halberstam, “The Wild Beyond: With and for the Undercommons”, intro to “The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study”) //MD

The mission then for the denizens of the undercommons is to recognize¶ that when you seek to make things better, you are not just doing¶ it for the Other, you must also be doing it for yourself. While men¶ may think they are being “sensitive” by turning to feminism, while¶ white people may think they are being right on by opposing racism,¶ no one will really be able to embrace the mission of tearing “this shit¶ down” until they realize that the structures they oppose are not only¶ bad for some of us, they are bad for all of us. Gender hierarchies are¶ bad for men as well as women and they are really bad for the rest of us.¶ Racial hierarchies are not rational and ordered, they are chaotic and¶ nonsensical and must be opposed by precisely all those who benefit¶ in any way from them. Or, as Moten puts it: “The coalition emerges¶ out of your recognition that it’s ~~fucked~~ [messed] up for you, in the same way¶ that we’ve already recognized that it’s ~~fucked~~ [messed] up for us. I don’t need¶ your help. I just need you to recognize that this shit is killing you, too,¶ however much more softly, you stupid motherfucker, you know?” The coalition unites us in the recognition that we must change things¶ or die. All of us. We must all change the things that are ~~fucked~~ [messed] up and¶ change cannot come in the form that we think of as “revolutionary” – not as a masculinist surge or an armed confrontation. Revolution¶ will come in a form we cannot yet imagine. Moten and Harney propose¶ that we prepare now for what will come by entering into study.¶ Study, a mode of thinking with others separate from the thinking that¶ the institution requires of you, prepares us to be embedded in what¶ Harney calls “the with and for” and allows you to spend less time antagonized¶ and antagonizing.